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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARVIN LYN GOTELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060605-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
•k ik * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of money laundering, both second degree 
felonies. He appeals from the restitution order imposed at sentencing. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err by following the recommendations of the 
presentence report, rather than the original plea agreement, with respect to the proper 
amount of restitution? 
Standard of Review: This claim was not raised below and is therefore reviewed 
for plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To obtain relief under 
the plain error doctrine, defendant must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant. Id. 
When properly raised, an appellate court "'will not disturb a trial court's 
restitution order 'unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its 
discretion.'" State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, \ 6, 82 P.3d 211 (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (West 2004): 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of money laundering, three counts of 
theft by deception, one count of issuing a bad check, and two counts of providing false 
personal information to a police officer. R. 1-3. Defendant subsequently agreed to plead 
guilty to two counts of money laundering in exchange for the other charges being 
dropped. R. 48-49. 
In his written plea agreement, defendant agreed to pay restitution to all of his 
victims. R. 44. Defendant specifically agreed to pay restitution to the victims who had 
been victimized in the dismissed counts. R. 44 ("I also know that I may be ordered to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement."). Although defendant's 
two guilty pleas only involved $7,600 in stolen funds, R. 42, defendant accordingly 
agreed to pay $14,150 in restitution. R. 44. 
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Defendant also agreed that the trial court would not be bound by the plea 
agreement with respect to sentencing. R. 45. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor 
described the plea agreement's sentencing terms as "recommendations/' and then 
explained that the presentence investigation report (PSI) could influence the court's 
sentencing decisions as well. R. 71: 2. Defendant did not object to that characterization. 
R. 71: 2. Prior to accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court informed defendant that it 
might not follow the plea agreement's sentencing recommendations. R. 71: 3-4. 
Defendant specifically acknowledged that the court could do this prior to pleading guilty. 
R. 71:4-5. 
A PSI was prepared and submitted before sentencing.1 The PSI concluded that 
defendant's victims actually had $14,609 in claims, rather than $14,150 as had been set 
forth in the plea agreement. PSI: 5. At sentencing, defendant acknowledged that he had 
received and read the PSI, and he informed the court that he did not have any corrections. 
R. 72: 2. The prosecutor then noted that the PSI had corrected a "mistake" regarding the 
amount of restitution and "ask[ed] the court to impose the amount indicated in the PSI, 
which is slightly higher than the amount we had come up with" in the plea agreement. R. 
72: 4. Defendant did not object to that recommendation. 
1
 The PSI is included in the appellate record in a non-paginated manila folder. 
The transcript indicates that defense counsel made an "inaudible" comment 
following the prosecutor's revised restitution recommendation. R. 72: 4. Although this 
inaudible comment could theoretically have been an objection to the prosecutor's 
recommendation, there is nothing in the record that would support such an inference. 
There is no reference anywhere else in the transcript to defendant having raised such an 
objection, and the court's official minutes from the sentencing hearing make no reference 
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The court accepted the PSFs restitution determination and ordered defendant to 
pay $14,609 in restitution. R. 72: 7. In its written judgment, the court ordered defendant 
to pay $3,000 to Traci Stokes-Lopez, $2,003.50 to Kimette Hughes, $2,003.50 to Kali 
Roberts, $7,600 to Josephine Miller, and $2.00 to Amy Crawford, thus totaling $14,609. 
R. 58. Defendant timely appealed. R. 64. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of money laundering. In the first count, 
defendant deposited $4,000 into his victim's bank account. R. 42. Defendant then 
contacted that victim, told her that he had only meant to deposit $2,000, and asked her to 
wire the extra $2,000 back to him. R. 42. The victim told defendant that she did not 
want any of the deposited money, so defendant convinced her to wire the entire $4,000 
back to him. R. 42. The victim later discovered that the original $4,000 deposit had been 
rejected for insufficient funds. R. 42. 
In the second count, defendant offered to give his victim $400. R. 42. He later 
contacted the victim, told her that he had mistakenly deposited $4,000, and asked her to 
return the excess $3,600 to him. R. 42. After the victim had hand-delivered $3,600 to 
him, R. 42, she discovered that there had been insufficient funds to cover the initial 
$4,000 deposit. PSI: 6. 
to there being any objection either. R. 55-56, 72: 4-9. Defendant also has not filed a 
motion to correct the record with this Court. 
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The PSI ultimately identified ten separate victims of defendant's schemes. PSI: 
5.3 The PSI also noted evidence suggesting that defendant had committed other 
fraudulent transactions, and therefore concluded that these cases were part of a larger 
scheme. PSI: 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that because he only "admitted responsibility for $14,150 in 
restitution," the trial court could not order him to pay $14,609 in restitution. Aplt. Br. 4-
6. This argument should be rejected for two reasons. First, defendant agreed to pay 
restitution to cover the claims of all of his victims. As set forth in the PSI, defendant's 
victims suffered $14,609 in losses, not $14,150 as had originally been contemplated. 
Defendant did not challenge the PSI's accuracy, and the trial court therefore did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering him to pay the higher amount. Second, the written plea 
agreement did not act as a concrete limitation on the court's sentencing authority. 
Instead, by its express terms, the plea agreement's sentencing recommendations were not 
binding on the court. Defendant acknowledged this prior to pleading guilty, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering him to pay the higher amount. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to enter findings to 
support the higher restitution order. Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court did 
"If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report 
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2004). As noted above, defendant did not challenge the accuracy 
of the PSI at his sentencing hearing. 
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enter written findings in support of its restitution order, and defendant has not properly 
challenged those findings on appeal. Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 
$14,609 in restitution, rather than the $14,150 set forth in the original plea agreement. 
Defendant did not object to the higher amount below, however, but instead asks this 
Court to review his claim for plain error. Aplt. Br. 2. Defendant's argument should be 
rejected for two reasons. 
First, Utah law allows a sentencing court to order restitution based on (1) the 
defendant's crimes or (2) "conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution 
as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (West 2004). In 
defendant's plea agreement, he specifically agreed to pay restitution to all of his victims, 
including those from the dismissed counts. R. 44 ("I also know that I may be ordered to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement."). While the original 
plea agreement estimated that these claims totaled $14,150, the PSI investigator later 
concluded that these claims actually totaled $14,609. PSI: 5. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2004), "[i]f a party fails to 
challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, 
that matter shall be considered to be waived." Defendant did not object to the PSI at 
sentencing, R. 72: 2-4, and he therefore waived his right to challenge the PSI's 
determination that his victims had $14,609 in claims. Given that defendant had already 
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agreed to pay restitution to cover the claims of all of his victims, the trial court did not 
plainly abuse its discretion by ordering him pay the higher amount. 
Second, the written plea agreement did not contain any fixed limitation on the trial 
court's sentencing authority. Instead, the agreement specifically stated that the trial court 
would not be bound by its terms at sentencing. R. 45. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor 
referred to the plea agreement's sentencing terms as "recommendations" and argued that 
its terms could be modified by the PSI. R. 71: 2. Defendant did not object to that 
characterization. R. 71: 2. 
Prior to accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court specifically informed defendant 
that it might depart from the sentencing terms set forth in the plea agreement. R. 71: 3-4. 
Defendant acknowledged that the court had this ability prior to entering his guilty pleas. 
R. 71: 4-5. After receiving the PSI, the prosecutor asked the court to deviate from the 
plea agreement and follow the PSI's higher restitution recommendation. R. 72: 2-4. 
Defendant did not object to that request or argue that the court did not have that authority. 
R. 72: 2-4. 
Under the express terms of defendant's plea agreement, the trial court did not have 
any obligation to comply with the plea agreement's sentencing recommendations. 
Instead, the plea agreement that defendant signed expressly gave the trial court the 
authority to impose a harsher sentence on him than was set forth in the plea agreement 
itself. Although defendant's plea agreement only contemplated $14,150 in restitution, the 
trial court had the authority to instead order defendant to pay $14,609 in restitution, and 
the court did not plainly abuse its discretion by ordering him to pay the higher amount. 
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Defendant also suggests that the trial court erred by failing to enter findings to 
support the higher restitution amount. Aplt. Br. 4-6. Contrary to defendant's claim, 
however, the trial court did enter findings to justify its restitution order. On June 23, 
2006, the court issued a written judgment in which it "found" that "pecuniary damages 
were incurred as a result of the criminal activity of the defendant." R. 58. The court then 
set forth those damages as follows: $3,000 to Traci Stokes-Lopez, $2,003.50 to Kimette 
Hughes, $2,003.50 to Kali Roberts, $7,600 to Josephine Miller, and $2.00 to Amy 
Crawford. R. 58. Thus, defendant is incorrect in asserting that the trial court failed to 
support its restitution order with findings.4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the restitution order. 
Respectfully submitted July J J_ , 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
D I 
RYAND. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
4
 In addition, defendant has not properly challenged these findings by marshaling 
the supporting evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 
106, Tfl 1, 999 P.2d 1252 (holding that a party must "marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack" (internal quotations and citation omitted). To the extent that 
defendant has implicitly contested the validity of those findings, that claim should be 
rejected for failure to marshal. 
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